Statutory Interpretations on Court Proceedings

“Well-known canons of statutory interpretation dictate that on occasions, the courts will interpret a statute contrary to its natural wording while maintaining that they are applying Parliament’s intention.”

            The operations of court proceedings greatly influence how an Act works. The courts must read an Act in its entirety, including headings, sub-sections, and punctuation. The court also takes into account various extrinsic factors such as judicial precedent dictionaries, as well as Law Commission reports. Pepper v Hart set the precedent for courts to rely on reports of proceedings or debates in Parliament. Also, the passage of the 1978 Interpretation Act effectively led to the development of the meaning of words that courts ought to apply except if an opposing intention is implied or expressed in a specific statute. For instance, the Act indicates that 'words importing the masculine gender include females', and words in singular encompass plural, while worlds in plural also contain singular words. Courts are time and again required to interpret statutes in their role of applying the law as developed by Parliament. What this means is that Parliament retains the prerogative of making law, while Courts are charged with the responsibility of implementing such laws as they have been developed. In other words, it is generally assumed that the Courts and in particular, Judges have no role to play in the development of laws. Even as the intention of Parliament ought to reign supreme in statutory interpretations, the courts are only likely to contemplate striking down certain primary legislations on speculative grounds.

In discerning the will of Parliament, the court considers presumptions against changing the law; a presumption against the retroactive impact of the law; and the assumption that the Crown could be bound by the will of Parliament. In case the court fails to discern a clear indication of the meanings of certain words, it may opt to apply certain principles that have developed from the court system itself. Sadly, the courts have failed to assume a steady approach to this activity, choosing instead to adopt somewhat radically diverse approaches.

The 'Literal Rule' constitutes one of these approaches. The rule holds that words ought to be interpreted in line with their ordinary, literal, and natural meaning. In Hutton v Esher, the issue of whether the word "land" encompasses buildings for the aim of compulsory purchase emerged. Based on the Interpretation Act, it was decided that land ought to encompass buildings as well unless contrary information to this effect has been communicated. Therefore, the buildings in question were purchased alongside the land. If courts encounter ambiguity in regards to certain wordings of the statute, they are at liberty to apply the 'Purposive Approach' principle. This rule permits the interpretation of words in their ordinary senses, as well as in terms of their purpose and context. In employing the purposive approach, the courts endeavour to "give effect to the purpose of legislation".

            The courts may also apply the Mischief Rule by considering the statute prior to passing the Act, the defect or mischief for which the statute could not be provided, the remedy appointed and resolved by Parliament in dealing with the mischief, and the explanation for such remedy.  For example, in Smith v Hughes (1960), the court ruled that a private building from where a prostitute solicited for harlotry was qualified as a “street or public place” with regard to the Act in order to evade the mischief brought about by harlotry.

            Nonetheless, under extreme circumstances, the courts may deem it necessary to strike down such legislation. Historically, the courts have been shown to decline to sanction even the most clear intentions of Parliament in case they perceive that doing so is likely to erode the rule of law. In other words, this is likely to happen in cases reviewing certain unlawful administrative actions that would imply that the courts can no longer uphold the rule of law. Nonetheless, in this type of court action, the courts are seen to pay lip service to the idea that they are actually implementing the intention of Parliament.

Well-established canons of law as regards statutory interpretation prescribe that the courts should on certain occasions interpret a statute at variance with its natural wording but still hold that they are actually implementing Parliament’s will. On several occasions, the courts have decided to revoke decisions arrived at under statutes even though such statutes do not contain any 'no certiorari' clauses, which basically stated that decisions arrived at under specific statutes ought not to be revoked. The existence of 'ouster clauses', which indicate that a definite decision 'shall not be called in question in any court of law' or related wording, has done little in the way of preventing courts from making interventions, especially if they feel that there has been an incidence of unlawfulness.  

Bibliography

Books

Hawke, Neil, Introduction to Administrative Law (Routledge, 2013 )185. 

Street, Amy, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law Who is in Control? (The Constitution Society, 2013) 45.

Case Laws

Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission[1969] 2 AC 147

Hutton v Esher UDC (1973) CA.

I.R.C v Hinchy [1960] AC 748.

Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3

Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830.

Acts

The Interpretation Act 1978