Why did the Soviet Union decide to militarily intervene in Afghanistan?
Introduction
In the almost seven-decade-long history of the Soviet Union, one of the dominant aspects that featured in its policies was its foreign military interventions. Ideology remained a key discursive and cognitive framework for the Soviet Union leaders (Roberts, 2005). The economic wealth, size, military, and political control of the Soviet Union ensured its dominance in the East European region. The decision by the Soviet Union to militarily invade and go to war with Afghanistan for a decade between 1979 and 1989 is considered a turning point of the Cold War (Ashton, 2007). Even today, the global implications of this war continue to afflict modern international society as evidenced by the ongoing struggle between Islamic extremist groups on the one hand, and the Western liberal democrats, on the other hand. Domestically, the war has dealt a heavy blow to Afghanistan's economy, society, and political institutions by rendering them fragile, not to mention that the country has since turned into a hotbed for religious fundamentalism and a combat zone for factional rivalries. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan marked its last major foreign military intervention as it was soon dissolved in 1991. On 25th December 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan's capital, Kabul with specific orders from Moscow to remove the radical Hafizullah Amin from power as the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and to replace him with Babrak Karmal, whom the Soviet Union had endorsed. Overthrowing Amin would help to protect the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) from its imminent collapse as it had become rather unpopular domestically, thereby putting it in danger of ceding to Western and Islamist forces (Morini, 2010). These were the views of the Politburo, the Communist Party's chief policymaking committee. The move was also deemed to help slow down the pace with which the communist revolution in Afghanistan was moving at. By shedding more light on these and other factors, this essay seeks to argue that the decision by the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan militarily was mainly driven by Russia's security concerns over Afghanistan's growing vulnerability to Western encroachment and Islamic extremism (Rumer, 2015), the growing unpopularity of Hafizul Amin with the Soviet leaders owing to his stance on communization, and a growing desire by the Soviet Union to expand its empire to include Afghanistan, thus taping into its mineral deposits (Feifer, 2009).
Reasons for the Invasion
There is need to understand this war from a historical perspective allows us to place the struggle into context. Most scholars such as Gates (2007) and Runion (2007) have tended to review this invasion from the lens of the Cold War namely, that the Soviet Union's invasion of foreign nations was inspired by the need to achieve prestige, socialist internationalism, as well as to keep their Western enemies at bay. Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, various historians interrelated this invasion within the broader context of the foreign policy to which the Soviet Union subscribed. Some referred to Russia's long-held desire to assert its control over Afghanistan that trace as far back as between 1813 and 1907, during the Great Game. The invasion was inspired by a possible access to the Gulf oilfields and warm water ports. Other historians such as Collins (2010) have cited the Soviet Union's quest for prestige as a possible reason for invasion, as it sought to maintain its hold on client states. Even though this explanation places the invasion within the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, they lack a differentiation factor with the other intentions that the Soviet Union took part in. contrary to the 1956 and 1968 military interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, respectively, in the case of Afghanistan, communism emerged without the interference of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Kremlin did not make an immediate intervention following the Heart Rebellion in March 1979 as it should have but had to wait till December owing to various short-term factors that influenced this decision (Weitz, 1992).
The invasion was the pinnacle of the USSR's active and increased involvement in the domestic affairs of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) following its emergence in 1978 and its inability to garner extensive backing for its socialist reforms (Meher, 2008). Between 27th and 28th April 1978, the Saur Revolution took place in Afghanistan, leading to the birthing of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Nur Muhhamad became the Premier of the DRA and also doubled as the General Secretary of PDPA; Babrak Karmal became deputy Premier, while the Foreign Affairs Minister post went to Hafizullah Amin (Meher, 2008). While the USSR quickly acknowledged the DRA, it was however carefully in engaging the country, as the Kremlin was not sure of the level to which the PDPA would remain politically stable given its lack of experience in dealing with Afghan politics (Fenzel, 2017). From the very start, the Taraki-led regime endeavoured to move Afghanistan into a new direction of leadership with the intention of transforming the country into a socialist republic (Fenzel, 2017). Nonetheless, the PDPA encountered stiff opposition following these reforms as they were in contrast with the Marxist-Leninist ideology that enjoyed widespread religious and cultural influence in Afghan society.
Aleksandr Puzanov, the then Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan made recommendations aimed at easing the pace at which reforms were being made in Afghanistan, as well as attempts to ensure that unity prevailed between the rival Parcham and Khalq factions (Halliday, 1999). Nonetheless, the ruling regime went ahead with the implementation of key female literacy campaigns and land reforms in early 1979. Taraki also eliminated Parahmites from his cabinet and ultimately, Karmal was sacked form his Foreign Affairs post in July 1978. This was a move by Taraki aimed at strengthening the hold on the Khalq in government (Kalinovsky, 2009). The reforms were greatest with widespread opposition across the countryside and led to the Heart Uprising in which rebels held violent demonstrations against the PDPA (Baker, 2011). Soldiers and military officers also joined the rebels, and the Soviet Union began to once again ponder over the future of Afghanistan. Moscow was committed to not lose Afghanistan and by August 1979, it had increased its advisors on the ground to 5000, up from 1000 in January. Moscow also started delivering helicopter gunships and tanks in large quantities into Afghanistan (Halliday, 1999). The Herat Uprising had two implications. First, it laid bare the unpopularity of the PDPA revolution and its inherent failures. Secondly, it heralded a change in the Soviet Union's foreign policy over Afghanistan. The USSR was not just seeking to mastermind a successful PDPA revolution but was keen on establishing a stable socialist transformation of the country.
From the point of view of the Afghans, Hafizul Amin was no longer popular with the Soviet leaders on account of his overzealousness in advancing the communization programme. The Soviet leaders therefore felt that Amin’s regime had undermined the gains brought about by the Saur Revolution. Moreover, according to Meher (2008), the Soviets held the perception that Hafizul Amin had stoked the hostility of Afghan freedom fighters, with the result that the Afghan ruling clique was now attracting international attention and criticism. The Soviet leaders thus plotted a scheme to overthrow his regime in September 1979 but the ensuing palace shoot-out led to the death of Taraki, the then President. At this point, it dawned on Amin that the Soviets had plotted to kill him, and this transformed him into an anti-Soviet nationalist-communist.
The Soviet Union also felt compelled to militarily intervene in Afghanistan owing to the rising Islamic fundamentalism in the country, as well as in the region. The Soviet Union was thus conscious that a successful Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan with which it shares a border, would translate into extensive outcomes in the Soviet Union. Already, Islamic fundamentalism was ruling in Iran, and with the Soviet Union already having an estimated 43 million Muslims, the leadership would not take the threat posed by this group lightly. In the three months that he was in power, Amin endeavoured to reach some compromise with nationalists and religious leaders, in a bid to realise a broad-based ruling regime (Jervis, 2016). There was also a growing sense that Amin was also willing to forge external ties with the West, a move that would likely antagonise the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union therefore felt that even a partial accommodation of the West externally or the Islamic fundamentalists internally "would have been a retrogressive step for the Soviets from the standpoint of bringing off a Communist revolution" (Meher, 2008, p. 55). Leonid Brezhnev, the then General Secretary of the CPSU's (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Central Committee, described Amin as an instigator of the ongoing violence in Afghanistan, while the Pravda editorial described him as a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) agent, and hence an imperialist stooge (Meher, 2008).
Although both the Soviet armed forces and the CPSU came under considerable pressure to reduce direct Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the military intervention exercise went on due to the persistence of policy-makers. To begin with, a narrow circle of influential individuals within the CPSU Politburo determined the involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The influential officials, on account of their seniority in the CPSU and the close relationships they enjoyed with the CPSU General Secretary, enabled them to form a consensus to sideline most of the officials who were opposed to their policies (Hartman, 2002). In addition, the General Secretary himself and other senior foreign policy officials shared a common concern that if communism in Afghanistan failed, this would deal a heavy blow to the Soviet Union's authority and position as the supporters of liberation and communist movements. Furthermore, Moscow sought to get involved in Afghanistan affair out of a conviction that it had the capacity to transform the country, ensure government stability, and ensure that the Communist regime in Kabul attained global acknowledgement. The Politburo consented to extend the presence of the Soviet military in Afghanistan on several occasions in a bid to realise success. However, the Soviet authorities could not effectively coordinate the activities of their different organisations in Kabul. There was competition among the KGB, the military, and among political advisors, and as a result, Moscow often had an inaccurate ad at times, partial understanding of the developments in Afghanistan, not to mention that they encountered contradictory and at times confused policy implementation.
With the success of the Iranian Revolution fresh on the minds of the Soviet Union key decision-makers and with the United States having docked its warships in the Persian Gulf which further fueled speculation that they planned to attack Iran, the Soviet Union was wary that Americans could very well very likely instigate counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan as well (Hartman, 2002). Suddenly, invading Afghanistan became an urgent operation as this would enable The Soviets to not only contain Afghan Islamism but also transform the country into a base that would enable them to invade Iran as well, in effect bringing about stability in the Gulf region. American encroachment of the Gulf region would thus isolate the Soviet Union geopolitically, as would Islam (Galster, 2001). Consequently, invading Afghanistan would allow the Soviets to protect their borders from potential encroachment by the United States while also stabilising the situation in Afghanistan by deposing Amin. As such, the decision to intervene militarily was arrived at based on the understanding that not doing so would render the Soviets' southern border highly vulnerable to American or Islamist encroachment. Nonetheless, Western and Islamism Encroachment per se were not sufficient reasons to convince the Politburo of the need to initiate a military intervention in Afghanistan. KGB officers who had been deployed in Afghanistan escalated the perceived security threat in the country as posed by the two aforementioned factors, thereby justifying the need for full scale invasion.
From the point of view of the western imperialists and especially the United States, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan was a crucial defensive step whose intention was to safeguard the core interests of the Soviet Union (Galster, 2001). Although Amin had started to warm up to the imperialist ideologies, and while the threat posed by the mujahidin resistance and Amin's alleged duplicity were all genuine concerns that could have triggered the Soviet Union's military invasion, these explanations are somewhat weak in terms of explaining the shear boldness and scale of the Soviet Union's actions. Therefore, as opposed to viewing the invasions as a defensive necessity, an argument could be held that this was more of an aggressive strategic gamble that the Soviet Union was undertaking, indicative of the willingness of the Soviet elite to endorse risky behaviour (Andrew & Mitrokhlin, 2005). Moscow had enjoyed recent success in its recent foreign policy. This coupled with its perception that the US had become weaker in its policy on Afghanistan also played a contributory role to the development of events. Viewed from this lens, the Soviet Union therefore felt compelled to protect its vital interests in Afghanistan from the marauding eyes of other regional and global powers such as Iran, Pakistan, the United States, and China. It was even alleged that had the Soviet Union not carried out the military intervention when it did, the U.S. would have initiated its own invasion (Feifer, 2009). Clearly, the Soviet Union would not have allowed such a thing to happen as it would have heralded a strategic threat to its "soft underbelly". However, there have been arguments that the Soviet Union made up the story of the external aggression to justify its military intervention in Afghanistan. This is underscored by the fact that in the months leading up to the invasions, the Soviets were the only external powers who exerted interference into Afghan affairs. Actually,
Washington had already conceded that Moscow was in charge of the affairs in Afghanistan, and so sought to focus its attention elsewhere. However, the United States had demonstrated a willingness to acknowledge the new PDPA government following the April Revolution and even offered Afghanistan a little economic assistance between May 1978 and March 1979. However, by July 1979, the US had demonstrated a growing decline in its commitment to Afghanistan, as evidenced by the downgrading of its embassy in the country to the status of a mission (Gates, 2007).
The unreliable nature of Amin therefore could have triggered the Soviet Union's decision to invade Afghanistan out of a growing concern that Amin might actually lead Afghanistan away from communism and the Soviet orbit, and possibly reorient Afghanistan towards the imperialist philosophy of the United States. Such a notion would have undeniably elicited a strong reaction from the USSR.
An argument has also been made to the effect that the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan to preserve socialist rule and restore order. Moreover, Brezhnev and other key leaders of the KGB viewed Afghanistan from the lens of the larger Cold War struggle. In this case, if the Soviet Union allowed the PDPA to fail, such a development would not only expose the 'reversibility of socialism', but it would also pose a danger to socialist states in the Third World which was politically vulnerable, including Ethiopia, South Yemen and Angola (Morini, 2010). Nonetheless, placing Afghanistan alongside these Third World nations is in itself an erroneous move as the country had never featured in the Soviet Union's sphere. However, the prestige of preserving the Soviet Union’s legitimacy heightened the security threat posed by the Amin regime in Afghanistan, thereby warranting a military invasion in order to protect the socialist model and with it, ensure that the Soviet borders remained intact from possible adversarial confrontation. As such, the influence of the troika on the Soviet Union's decision-making process was also a determining factor in the decision to invade Afghanistan. This was realised mainly via the manipulation tactics employed by the Troika within the Politburo. Andropov backed claims made by the KGB that Amin had Western links, confirming that he had been recruited by the CIA while pursuing further studies in America.
On the other hand, Andropov underplayed contrasting reports that gave little attention to the worsening situation on the ground in Afghanistan. In the same way, Ustinov supported intervention, declaring that anything short of a military invasion would have far-reaching implications on the region's strategic military situation and that this would jeopardise Soviet security (Saikal & Maley, 1989). Moreover, to endorse military intervention, the trio consistently suppressed the voices of Politburo members who were opposed to intervention. The trio's influence on the decision-making process in the Soviet Union finally set the stage for the ultimate decision to invade. Brezhnev was upbeat that a military intervention remained the only effective option available to the USSR to enable them to protect their Southern border while also protecting the PDPA from escalating threats.
The end of détente in 1979, also acted as the perfect timing for the Soviet Union to initiate a military intervention in Afghanistan. There was a growing concern among Soviet decision-makers about the implications of a military intervention in Afghanistan on the détente framework. This is because détente hindered the USSR from taking socialist internationalism action as it had done in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, (Daigle, 2012). However, the demise of détente meant that the Soviets could opt for a military intervention without provoking the United States. Throughout 1979, President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev were still rocked in negotiations over SALT II (Kalinovsky, 2011). Therefore, for the Soviets to even contemplate invading Afghanistan, such a move would have seemed hypocritical while at the same time also deliberating on reducing their armaments stockpiles. However, in July 1979, the U.S. Congress did not sanction SALT II, thereby freeing off the Soviets from the security framework to which they were bound.
Afghanistan is also a state of geopolitical importance in the region. Despite it being an obscure and remote country that is also ranked amongst the poorest countries on the globe, it is strategically located thus acting as a point of link between the Indian sub-continent with Russia, and the Orient with the Middle East. On account of this landlocked nation's pivotal geopolitical position, it has constantly become the focal point for rival empires (Morini, 2010). It acted as a buffer state between Greta Britain which had occupied India between the 19th and 20th century and Czarist Russia who had occupied central Asia. Afghanistan thus acted as a barometer of the balance of power in the region (Collins, 2010). When in 1978 the Soviet Union turned Afghanistan into its satellite state, this underlined the Soviet Union's long-standing desire to occupy the region occupied by its southern neighbours. Invading Afghanistan has also been viewed by historians as a strategy by the Soviet Union to institute military pressure on Iran and extend its influence towards the Arabian Sea.
Conclusion
The decision by the Soviet Union to militarily intervene in Afghanistan was due to various closely related interests and concerns within Moscow. Afghanistan was already embroiled in a political crisis, and this posed a threat to the very survival of the PDPA regime whose demise would send signals of the waning influence of Communism. At the same time, the political crisis yielded to rising Islamist fundamentalism and the likely encroachment of the region by the West and in particular, the United States. Whatever scenario reigned supreme, the Soviet was faced with the risk that their southern border would be encircled by a hostile power, and this would in turn jeopardise their security. Other factors also accelerated or exacerbated the decision by the Soviet Union to militarily intervene in Afghanistan. In particular, KCB officers on the ground in Afghanistan took advantage of Soviet Union's security threats by distorting and exaggerating the true situation on the ground, in a bid to fulfil their individual vested interests following an invasion and deposing of Amin. The troikas also dominated the decision-making process of the Politburo and this too influenced the decision to invade Afghanistan. Internationally, the demise of the détente also meant that Moscow could now undertake military intervention without being seen to have reneged on the promise of disarmament.
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